The Political Economy of Clientelism. by James A Robinson & Thierry Verdier
Scand. J. of Economics 115(2), 260–291, 2013
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2013.12010.x
The Political Economy of Clientelism∗
James A. Robinson
Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138, USA
jrobinson@gov.harvard.edu
Thierry Verdier
Paris School of Economics, FR-75014 Paris, France
tv@pse.ens.fr
Abstract
In this paper, we argue that the political-commitment problem provides an explanation for
why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form, particularly employment in the
public sector. A job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents (such as
in situations with moral hazard), and employment is optimal ex post. Moreover, a job is
selective and reversible, and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political
success of a particular politician. We show that the need to make offers of employment
incentive-compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods. We also show that
such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality
and low productivity. Inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high, when
inequality is high, and when money matters less than ideology in politics.
Keywords: Income redistribution; political competition; public policy
JEL classification: H1; H2
I. Introduction
A basic source of bad economic policies is pressure to redistribute income,
which, at least in democratic systems, stems from the fact that political
power is distributed more equally than assets and income. Yet (at least) two
key problems remain in building a satisfactory theory of the incidence and
implications of redistribution. First, there is a dichotomy in the theoretical
body of literature between research that emphasizes the fact that politicians
or political parties can only commit to actions that are ex post rational (see
Alesina, 1988; Besley and Coate, 1997), and research (following Downs,
1957) that allows politicians to commit to any policy they desire. Second,
in many countries, it appears to be not just that there is redistribution, but
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also that this takes singularly inefficient forms. For instance, redistribution
often involves offers of employment in the bureaucracy. Alesina et al.
(2001) have argued that as much as half of the wage bill of the public
sector in the south of Italy can be seen as pure redistribution, and many
studies have found that the size of the public sector measured in terms of
employment is greater when there is more clientelism (e.g., Gimpleson and
Treisman, 2002; Calvo and Murillo, 2004).
In this paper, we argue that a deeper comprehension of the issue of
political commitment can help us to understand why income redistribution
takes an inefficient form. A novel aspect of our approach is that, contrary
to the existing body of literature, we see the issue of credibility as being
two-sided, and we develop the notion of redistributive politics as an ex-
change relationship. Self-interested politicians face a commitment problem,
because it is not in their interests to implement ex post the policies that
would induce people to vote for them. Politicians – whether an incumbent
government or the opposition – would like to offer policies to groups of
citizens in exchange for political support. Because the law cannot be used
to enforce such political exchanges, they must be self-enforcing. However,
the problem of credibility is two-sided. Just as politicians might wish to
commit to actions that are not ex post optimal, so might citizens. For
example, a citizen might prefer a left-wing party, but would vote for the
right if offered sufficient selective incentives. Therefore, citizens must in-
deed deliver their support, and politicians, once in power, must pay for the
support with the policies that they promised.
For politicians to ensure that they have the support of a group of citizens,
they must be able to use policies that tie the continuation utility of a voter
to their political success, or alternatively, if behavior is observable,1 allow
voters to be punished if they renege on the exchange. For citizens to ensure
that politicians honor their promises, the policies must be ex post rational
for the politicians to implement.
We argue that the appeal of offers of employment in the bureaucracy
is precisely that a job is a credible, selective, and reversible method of
redistribution, which ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political
success of a particular politician.2 Why is an offer of employment credible
1 Such situations include elections without a secret ballot or where patrons can effectively
monitor voting behavior (see Chubb, 1982, for a detailed analysis of how the Christian
Democratic party avoided the secret ballot in Southern Italy), or intrinsically observable
political activities, such as collective action. Note that even with a secret ballot, the behavior
of aggregates of voters is known (electoral districts) and these can also be punished.
2 An interesting example of incentive-compatible redistribution has been discussed by Chubb
(1982). Before elections, the Christian Democratic party would distribute a left shoe to
its clients with the promise of a right shoe if they were re-elected. Interestingly, because,
presumably, a right shoe is useless to the party, this was an incentive-compatible contract.
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when other types of policies, such as income transfers, are not? First,
because of moral hazard, optimal employment contracts concede rents to
workers. Second, because of the costs of raising taxes on the private sector,
employment in the bureaucracy is a relatively attractive way for politicians
to generate rents. Thus, an offer of a job is a credible way of transferring
rents to specific voters. When political behavior is observable, a job has
the additional advantage that it can be withdrawn as a punishment.
Therefore, inefficiency in the form of redistribution arises because it rep-
resents one way in which the political-commitment problem can be solved.
There is inefficiency not only because employment in the public sector is
relatively inefficient, but also because the amount of rents transferred to
clients by employment depends on the amount of investment and/or pub-
lic goods also provided by the government. In essence, the credibility of
politicians’ and voters’ promises depend on the levels of other policy vari-
ables. We show that underprovision of investment or public goods results,
in order to make employment offers more attractive to voters. Our analysis
suggests that one sort of inefficient government policy arises as a way of
making voters more dependent on politicians, and hence making it easier
to buy their political support with job offers.3
Our conceptualization of redistributive politics is close to what is known
as “patronage” or, more broadly, “clientelism” in anthropology and political
science.4 Clientelism is a political exchange: a politician (i.e., a “patron”)
gives patronage in exchange for the vote or support of a “client”. The
dominant stylized fact in this body of literature is that, in clientelism, it
is jobs that are exchanged for votes. In the words of Weingrod (1968,
p. 379), “patronage refers to the way in which party politicians distribute
public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support”. In her well-
known analysis of the Christian Democratic political machine in Southern
Italy, Chubb (1982, p. 91) notes that “a substantial part of politics revolves
3 The idea that clientelism leads to an undersupply of public goods is widespread in the
informal body of literature. The analysis of agricultural policy in Africa by Robert Bates
provides a classic statement of the idea that clientelistic redistribution via public goods is
politically inefficient because it does not provide an incentive-compatible way for patrons to
control clients. Bates (1981, p. 114) argues: “Were the governments of Africa to confer a
price rise on all rural producers, the political benefits would be low; for both supporters and
dissidents would secure the benefits of such a measure, with the result that it would generate
no incentives to support the government in power. The conferral of benefits in the form of
public works projects, such as state farms, on the other hand, has the political advantage of
allowing the benefits to be selectively apportioned. The schemes can be given to supporters
and withheld from opponents.”
4 Some scholars use patronage and clientelism as interchangeable terms (Kitschelt and Wilkin-
son, 2007), whereas others argue that “clientelism is a much broader phenomenon than pa-
tronage, with patronage simply one specific type of clientelistic exchange” perhaps restricted
to “the use of resources and benefits that flow from public office” (Hicken, 2011, p. 295).
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around the posto (‘job or position’) and . . .when all is said and done, a job
signifies a vote and vice versa.”
The analysis of clientelism in India by Weiner (1967, p. 34) is similar.
He argues that the Congress party became “a means of obtaining jobs
for friends and relatives and of gaining access to the many services and
material benefits which government at all levels can bestow.”
This body of literature never explains why patronage takes the form of
employment, although interestingly it usually implicitly emphasizes both the
issue of commitment and the fact that the reversibility of an employment
offer is part of its political attractiveness. For instance, Piattoni (2001,
p. 7) argues that patrons “cannot be sure that the ‘clientelistic deal’ will
be honored, as no legal enforcement mechanisms can be devised.” In his
analysis of the clientelistic political machine in Chicago, Wilson (1961, p.
373) notes that “the power of a ward leader over the jobs assigned to him
is called, in Chicago, the power to ‘vice them downtown’ – that is, the
power to replace one worker on the payroll with another.”
Our model captures several of the elements stressed in this informal
body of literature. In particular, we emphasize that the social network of
individuals whose behavior politicians can observe relatively well will de-
termine who politicians can credibly exchange with – perhaps because they
interact socially with these individuals. In this context, Turner and Young
(1985, p. 158) note that the “formation of a patron–client relationship is
based not only on reciprocal advantage, but on some principle of affinity
which supplies a social logic to the network. Kinship and ethnic affinity
are the most frequent bases for network formation.”
Because of its effect of ameliorating the moral-hazard problem, this
network – a clientele – allows politicians to make credible employment
offers to such people.5
Apart from providing a characterization of the types of inefficiencies
that clientelistic politics generate, we also address the question of when
such a system of politics is likely to be prevalent. We show that, under
a natural condition, clientelism is relatively important in countries with
poor technology and high inequality. Intuitively, at low income levels, the
political allegiance of clients is cheaper to buy with employment offers, and
this makes clientelistic redistribution more attractive as a way of gaining
support. This effect operates when aggregate productivity is low or, for
given productivity and average income level, when inequality increases.
Next, we show that when there is clientelism, various factors influence the
extent of inefficiency. In particular, policy is less efficient (1) when the
5 Such social networks have been emphasized by Stokes (2005), and measured by Finan and
Schechter (2012).
C© The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2013.
264 J. A. Robinson and T. Verdier
stakes or rents to staying in power are greater,6 (2) when ideology is more
important relative to monetary incentives in determining the outcome of
elections, and (3) when, under reasonable conditions, and conditional on
clientelism existing, there is greater inequality.
These comparative statics help us to understand why it is that the politics
of developing countries, particularly in Africa, seem to be particularly
clientelistic. Clientelism emerges in countries where productivity is low.
Thus, poverty both causes and is caused by clientelism. This is consistent
with a main idea of the political science literature that it is modernization
and development that destroy clientelism; for overviews of the literature
making this claim, see Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) and Hicken (2011),
and for econometric evidence, see Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci (2011).
We further show that the inefficiencies associated with clientelism are
intensified when the relative stakes of politics are relatively large. It is
frequently argued that this is a key problem in Africa. For example, Hodder-
Williams (1984, p. 95) notes that the state “dominates the job market, is
deeply involved in most economic activities and commands control over an
extremely wide range of goods and services as well as badges of status. The
lack of a developed indigenous private sector, of entrenched pressure groups
and of secondary organizations results in the monopolistic state.” Not only
is the state economically dominant but state income in Africa is also
dominated by natural resources and historically non-contingent international
aid. Both increase the inefficiency of clientelism in our model, which
provides a political-economy explanation for the “natural resource curse”.
Finally, again in line with our results, Alesina et al. (2000) have shown
that, within the US, higher inequality leads to greater redistribution in the
form of public-sector employment.
Our analysis is clearly related to many ideas in the body of literature on
redistributive politics, particularly Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit
and Londregan (1996, 1998). These authors have determined some of the
characteristics that a group must have to be an attractive target for redis-
tribution. However, their models assume commitment to policy and feature
pure redistribution with no analyses of efficiency, except when deadweight
losses from redistribution are introduced. Also related to our paper are the
models that show that the desire to manipulate the future political equi-
librium can induce inefficient policies (see Besley and Coate, 1998, and
references therein). In these models, the basic cause of inefficiency is that
politicians cannot commit to future policy.
6 Interestingly, although we do not develop this observation in our model, the very fact that
clientelism tends to reduce the supply of public goods automatically raises the stakes from
politics. If a government is providing public goods, then even losers at elections benefit from
subsequent government spending. Therefore, concentrating on the provision of private goods
widens the utility from being in or out of office.
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Our work is perhaps most closely related to, and complements, research
on inefficiencies in the form of redistribution. There are three arguments.
(1) Coate and Morris (1995) have argued that inefficiencies in the form
of redistribution arise because of the desire by politicians to hide the fact
that they were redistributing. (2) Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) have ar-
gued that inefficient redistribution arises as a way to maintain the political
strength of a group. (3) Persson and Tabellini (1999) and Lizzeri and Per-
sico (2001) have argued that inefficient spending on a public good might
arise because private goods can be better targeted by politicians to support-
ers. Although public-sector employment as a method of redistribution is
not discussed in any of this research,7 the first and third arguments can be
applied to explain this. For example, according to Coate and Morris, public-
sector employment could be a politically attractive method of redistributing,
if politicians could argue that actually such employment was socially desir-
able and not really redistribution. Nevertheless, there are problems with this
approach. First, the overwhelming body of evidence suggests that public-
sector employment in developing countries is too large, and reducing it
is typically a key part of structural adjustment programs. Therefore, it is
not clear that uncertainty about its inefficiency is plausible. Moreover, for
this theory to apply, politicians must have no way of proving their type.
The empirical body of literature on public-sector employment in developing
countries is far more consistent with the view that voters understand that
it is inefficient and that it is precisely a way for a politician to reward
supporters. The third model would explain redistribution via employment
simply by the fact that a job can be targeted. While this might be impor-
tant, offers of money or private goods can also be targeted. A contribution
of our model is to explain why an offer of employment might be credible,
when an offer of income is not.
Finally, a small formal body of literature has recently begun to provide
models of clientelism. Like us, Stokes (2005) has emphasized the com-
mitment problem when, with a secret ballot, voters might not be able to
credibly promise to vote in the way they agree to in a clientelistic exchange.
She examines the way that patrons might be able to use punishment strate-
gies to stop clients reneging on promises. In our paper, we show that this
credibility problem can be solved without the use of repeated play, and we
also consider the commitment problem of the patron. Keefer and Vlaicu
(2008) have focused on the same one-sided credibility problem, and have
argued that it leads to clientelism. However, they have assumed a struc-
ture of clientelism where politicians get votes via patrons, which assumes
the credibility of this form of exchange. In our paper, we show how the
7 Shleifer and Vishny (1994) have provided a rare model where redistribution takes place via
employment, but they have simply assumed this rather than explaining it.
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form of the exchange between patron and client endogenously determines
whether or not it is credible.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II. we set up our basic model.
We analyze this when voting is unobservable (Section III. and observable
Section IV). In Sections V and VI. we consider two extensions to allow for
more groups of agents, and also inequality. We conclude in Section VII.
II. The Basic Environment
We now develop our formal model, which is a version of the standard
probabilistic voting model (see Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Persson and
Tabellini, 2000). In this model, individuals gain utility not only from the
values of policy variables chosen by politicians, but also from the charac-
teristics of the politicians themselves. In particular, the model posits that
voters are ideologically more or less attached to one or other of the politi-
cians, and that when deciding how to vote they weigh up the net benefits,
taking into account not just the policies offered by a politician but also the
intrinsic utility they obtain from supporting the politician.
Consider a static model with four types of agents. There is an incumbent
political decision-maker (i.e., the patron, denoted by a superscript “P”), a
potential patron who contests power (denoted by a superscript “N”), and two
groups of voters/clients (indexed by g = 1, 2). Group g has a population of
size λg. Initially, the incumbent patron chooses the level of a policy variable
I , and then competes for power in an election contested by the potential
patron. The patrons compete by offering tax rates, transfers of income, and
government employment to clients. After the election, whichever patron
wins takes power and adopts a policy (which might or might not be what
was offered in the election), after which production and consumption take
place.
Agents have the following preferences and budget sets. Each voter has
an ideological bias for the patron (and against the potential patron). A
representative member i of group g has a linear utility function, U iP(.) ≡
ci − ψ(ei ) + δi + θ , if voting for the patron, and utility function U iN(.) ≡
ci otherwise. Here, ci is consumption of agent i and ei is effort exerted
in production at the cost in utility terms of ψ(ei ). The terms δi and θ are
the variables that capture the ideological proclivities of individual agents. If
they are positive for a specific voter i , then this means that the voter has an
intrinsic preference for the patron. For example, if both the incumbent and
potential patron offered the same policy, such a voter would vote for the
patron. One of these variables, δi , is individual-specific, while the other,
θ , is an aggregate shock common to all agents. We assume that δi is
uniformly distributed on the interval
[−(1/2sg), (1/2sg)], where δi for all
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i in group g has density sg > 0. We further assume that θ is uniformly
distributed on the interval [−(1/2h), (1/2h)], and thus has density h > 0.
Individuals have income from one of two sources: the public sector or the
private sector. If working in the private sector, each has a pre-tax income
of Ay(I ), which is a differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave
function of the amount of the policy variable I chosen by the incumbent
patron before the election takes place. A is a parameter capturing total
factor productivity. We assume that income can be converted one-for-one
into the variable chosen by the patron, and that y(0) > 0. Voters can hide
their income at some cost in an informal sector, which is non-taxable.
We assume specifically that if agents move their income into the informal
sector, they lose a proportion 1 − α of this income, so that income in the
informal sector would be αAy(I ).8
If working in the public sector, voters have to choose an effort level
e ∈ {0, ε} and are paid a wage w jg for j = P, N, which might depend on
the identity of who wins the election. Exerting effort e incurs a cost of
ψ(e) with ψ(ε) > ψ(0) ≡ 0, and R(e) is the productivity of an individual
public-sector worker as a function of effort. We let q jg be the probability
that the effort exerted by a worker in group g employed in the public sector
is observed by patron j = P, N.
We distinguish the groups by their values of q and by who can observe
them. Specifically, we assume the following.




2 > R(ε)/ψ(ε) for j =
P, N.
This assumption implies that the moral-hazard problem is not too bad,
and that therefore the incumbent can make positive rents from employing
a member of group 1 in the public sector. However, the potential patron
cannot make any rents from members of group 1, and neither patron can
do so from members of group 2. We call the members of group 1 the
clients of the incumbent patron. Because the incumbent patron is in the
same social network as these agents, this patron can observe their effort
with relatively high probability, which reduces the moral-hazard problem
sufficiently that the patron can make them credible employment offers.9
The incumbent patron cannot do this to group 2, and the potential patron
8 This is just a simple modeling device that makes the tax base elastic with respect to the
tax rate, and avoids corner solutions where the tax rate is one.
9 The assumption that members of a group can observe the actions of members in the same
group better than the actions of people in other groups has been used by Fearon and Laitin
(1996), and the basis of the type of clientelism has been studied by Finan and Schechter
(2012).
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cannot make credible offers to any group – having no clients. We focus
on this asymmetric case because it allows us to illustrate, in the simplest
ways, the nature of the forces at work. We later sketch an extension of
the model to three groups, which allows the potential patron to also have
clients.
Patrons attempt to maximize their expected consumption. If in power,
their consumption consists of tax revenues minus transfers plus total profits
from public employment, which is [R(e) − w jg]n jg, where n jg is the number
of voters employed from group g by patron j in the public sector. Instead
of employing a voter to generate rents R(e), we assume that the patron has
access to another technology, which generates rents  ≡ R(ε) − ψ(ε)/qP1 .10
The patron who loses the election receives zero consumption.
At the start of the period, there is an election in which the patron
and potential patron compete for power. They compete by offering three
types of policies: (1) the group-specific level of a lump-sum tax T jg ; (2) the
group-specific level of transfer m jg ≥ 0; (3) the number of agents from each
group to employ in the public sector, n jg. We denote the policy offered by




g ), and the policy offered by the potential patron




g ). We assume that collecting taxes is costly in the sense that
some tax revenues are dissipated.
The timing of the game is as follows.
• The incumbent patron chooses I .





g). When voting behavior is observable, these offers can
be made conditional on voting behavior.
• Whichever patron wins the election takes power and optimally chooses





• Production, taxation, and consumption take place.
10 The role of this alternative technology will become apparent in the model where voting
is observable. In this case, the patron makes a contingent offer of a job in exchange for
support. Thus, if a voter does not support the patron, it must be credible ex post for the
patron not to employ the deviating voter. However, if the patron is employing all of the
group, then the patron can monitor effectively; because the patron receives positive rents
ex post from employment, it might not be credible to deny a deviating voter a job. The
alternative technology, which gives exactly the same amount of rents to the patron as a voter
employed at the efficiency wage, provides a simple way of making credible the threat not to
employ. In the Appendix, we sketch a more realistic alternative model, where some potential
employees are left unemployed in order to make the threat of non-employment credible. The
results we prove below extend to this case, but the algebra is much more involved, and this
motivates our assumptions in the text.
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Credible Policies
We solve for the pure strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the
above game. To do so, we apply backward induction. Note, immediately,





chosen ex post to maximize utility. This has important implications for
what policies will arise. First, it must be true that m̃ jg = 0 for all j and
g. Whatever promise a patron makes to transfer income when in power in
exchange for votes is not credible. This will have the effect of ruling out
as not credible any offer of transfers for support. Next, note similarly that
T̃ jg will be chosen optimally, implying that T̃
j
g = (1 − α)Ay(I ). The tax
rate is set in order to make voters just indifferent between keeping their
income in the formal sector and moving it into the informal sector. This is
the revenue-maximizing tax rate for whichever patron wins power; no other
rate is credible. However, as noted above, taxation is costly. To model this,
we assume that a fraction 1 − τ of any tax revenues is destroyed.
Finally, we consider public-sector employment. The qualitative difference
between such employment and a pure transfer of income is that employment
generates rents for the patron. Moreover, because of the existence of moral
hazard, some of these rents might be transferred to employees (efficiency
wages). We now consider the circumstances under which patrons can make
credible commitments to transfer rents to clients by employing them.
Offered a wage w jg , a client will exert effort if
w jg − ψ(ε) ≥
(
1 − q jg
)
w jg





where (1 − q jg ) is the probability that effort is not observed. Thus, wPg =
ψ(ε)/qPg will be the efficiency wage offered by the incumbent patron, which
decreases with qPg . Clearly, w
P
g − ψ(ε) ≡ ψ(ε)qPg − ψ(ε) > 0 (when q
P
g < 1).
There is one other constraint to consider, however. A voter accepts an offer
of employment at this wage only if
wPg − ψ(ε) ≥ αAy(I ), (2)
which is a standard participation constraint. This constraint plays an im-
portant role in the analysis below. When equation (2) is slack, it im-
plies that the efficiency wage (1) provides rents for the voter. However,
when equation (2) binds, it implies that the wage has to be such that
w = αAy(I ) + ψ(ε) and public-sector employment no longer transfers rents
to the voters. In this case, public-sector employment cannot be used as a
way to influence the outcome of the election.
C© The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2013.
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, ψ(ε) + αAy(I )
}
. (3)
Finally, it should be optimal for the incumbent patron to employ clients ex
post, which entails
R(ε) − wPg ≥ (1 − α)τ Ay(I ). (4)
The benefit R(ε) − wPg that incumbent patrons derive from providing a
public-sector job to one of their clients should be higher than (1 −
α)τ Ay(I ) (i.e., the tax revenue that can be extracted from having that
client work in the private sector). Intuitively, to be optimal for the patrons
to employ their clients ex post, employment should be a relatively more
effective method of extracting resources from citizens. It is the ex post
optimality of this that makes it a credible method for the patron to make
promises.
Taken together, equations (3) and (4) describe the set 
 of public wages
and public investment levels, which are consistent with credible offers by
the incumbent patron to transfer rents to his clients. This is represented
in Figure 1. More public investment I reduces the ability of the patron
to transfer clientelistic rents for two reasons. The first reason is a rent
dissipation effect, related to the participation constraint of the clients. As
I goes up, this participation constraint becomes binding and public-sector
employment no longer transfers rents. The second reason is a credibility
effect, associated with the ex post optimality constraint of the patron. An
increase in I makes it more attractive for the patron to extract resources
through direct taxation, and therefore makes public-sector employment less
credible ex post. As shown in Figure 1, the precise shape of 
 depends
on which effect (rent dissipation or credibility) is binding first. Now, we
make an assumption to focus on the main case of interest.
Assumption 2. Ay(0) > R(ε) − ψ(ε) and (1 − α)τ/α > [R(ε) − ψ(ε)]/
[(1 − qPg )ψ(ε)].
Assumption 2 guarantees two things. The first part implies that Ay(I ) >
R(ε) − ψ(ε) for all I , which means that the socially efficient level of public
employment is zero. The second part, (1 − α)τ/α > [R(ε) − ψ(ε)]/[(1 −
qPg )ψ(ε)], implies that we concentrate on the case where, at the efficiency
wage wPg = ψ(ε)/qPg , the participation constraint (2) is always slack when-
ever the patron’s offer is credible (i.e., equation (4) is slack). In other
words, we focus on the case where the binding constraint on clientelism is
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Fig. 1. The set of credible policies
equation (4) as public investment I goes up. This will be satisfied if public-
sector employment is not a very efficient method of extracting resources
from citizen, as is probably plausible.
Having determined what policies are credible, we now move backward
to the election stage. Here, we make a distinction between situations where
the patrons can or cannot observe voting behavior. We begin by analyzing
the simpler case, which is when patrons cannot observe voting behavior.
In this case, policy offers cannot be made contingent on voting decisions.
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III. Non-Observable Voting
Consider now the voting behavior of agents in different groups. For the
above analysis, we know what tax rate either patron sets ex post and we
know that promises of transfers of income are never credible. However,
employment is credible to specific groups. In the group where only the
patron can credibly make job offers, voter i supports the patron if
wP1 − ψ(ε) + δi + θ ≥ αAy(I ). (5)
This constraint is, of course, the same as in the standard probabilistic voting
model. In equation (5), the patron offers a job and net utility of wP1 − ψ(ε)
to a member of group 1, and agent i of this group supports the patron if
this, plus the utility of voting for the patron, is larger than the pay-off from
the potential patron. The pay-off that such an agent will receive from the
potential patron is given by the right-hand side of equation (5). This takes
into account the fact that the potential patron cannot credibly promise to
employ anybody, and also that the person does not receive intrinsic utility
from voting for the potential patron. In consequence, the person will receive
an after-tax income (and thus utility) under the potential patron of αAy(I ).
Rearranging equation (5), we can see that a member of group 1 supports
the incumbent patron if
δi ≥ αAy(I ) − [wP1 − ψ(ε)] − θ. (6)
Let Ng ∈ [0, λg] be the total number of people in group g that support the
patron. We can calculate this by integrating over the set of agents from











wP1 − ψ(ε) − αAy(I ) + θ
]}
.


















≡ PP (I ) .
This is simply the probability that at least one-half of the population support
the incumbent in the election. Note that from the equations of N1 and N2,
this is equivalent to the probability that the aggregate ideology shock θ is
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sufficiently large. Simplifying, this probability is

















where the exact formula comes from integrating over the support of the
distribution of θ from −λ1s1[wP1 − ψ(ε) − αAy(I )] to the upper limit 1/2h.
For simplicity, we have normalized so that
∑
g λgsg = 1.
Taking I as given, what is the nature of political competition now?
Notice that the incumbent patron can only commit to credibly give a client
net utility of wP1 − ψ(ε) if he is in group 1. The patron cannot credibly
offer anything to any other agent. However, the potential patron can make
no credible offers. In this case, given I , there is essentially nothing to
compete over at the election stage. It is simply a case of calculating who
can make credible offers to whom, checking that it is profitable to make
offers to all such agents, and then computing the equilibrium probability
of winning the election. This is what is captured in the function PP (I ).
Given Assumption 2, note that equation (2) is slack as long as I satisfies
R(ε) − wP1 > (1 − α)τ Ay(I ) and PP (I ) > 1/2.11 When R(ε) − wP ≤ (1 −
α)τ Ay(I ), then the incumbent patron cannot make any credible offer to
clients, and PP (I ) = 1/2 for all such levels of I .
Equilibrium Clientelism and Inefficiency
Having computed the probability that the patron wins the election, we
can now solve for the optimal choice of I . Two regimes are possible
depending on the level of I . Let us denote as Ĩ (A) the value of I such that
(1 − α)τ Ay(I ) = R(ε) − wP1 = R(ε) − ψ(ε)/qPg . For I ≤ Ĩ (A), the patron
can offer credible public-sector employment to voters; we refer to this as
the clientelistic regime. For I > Ĩ (A), the patron prefers to have all voters
work in the private sector, and there is no clientelism. We denote this
alternative regime as non-clientelistic.
In the clientelistic regime, ex ante the patron maximizes
max
I
V Pc (I , A) = PP (I )
{





} − I (8)
11 If it were binding then, w = αAy(I ) + ψ(ε). Substituting this into equation (5), we see
immediately that the ability of the patron to bias the outcome of the election vanishes, and
we have PP(I ) = 1/2.
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s.t . I ≤ Ĩ (A), (9)
where all of group 1 is employed, while no members of groups 2 are em-
ployed. Abstracting from the constraint I ≤ Ĩ (A), the first-order condition














= −hλ1s1αAy′(I ). (11)
We assume that the second-order condition for the incumbent patron’s
maximization problem is satisfied. Let I maxc (A) be the level of investment
given implicitly by the marginal condition (10). Then, the solution of equa-
tion (8), which we refer to as the clientelistic optimum, is simply given by
Ṽ Pc (A) = V Pc (min{I maxc (A), Ĩ (A)}, A).
The condition (10) captures three key effects governing the marginal
incentives in the choice of I . The last term, −1, is simply the
marginal cost of investment. The term PP(1 − α)τ Ay′(I )λ2 is the expected
marginal benefit in terms of a higher tax base if elected (the incumbent
does not care about increasing the tax base in the event of losing power).
However, the final term comes from the effect of I on the probability
of winning the election. From equation (5), we can see that higher I in-
creases the amount of utility that the potential patron can offer to members
of group 1, relative to what the patron can credibly offer. This effect tends
to reduce I . Intuitively, the incumbent has an incentive to reduce invest-
ment in order to increase the attractiveness of the credible offer, making
the voters more dependent upon the employment offer.
The following proposition characterizes the inefficiency of the equilib-
rium level of investment in the clientelistic regime.
Proposition 1. In the clientelistic regime, the equilibrium level of provision
of the good I ∗c = min{I maxc (A), Ĩ (A)} is smaller than the socially efficient
level of provision of the good I e given by 1 = Ay′(I e).
Equation (10) tells us that at the government policy I maxc (A), the so-
cial marginal product Ay′(I ) of good I is necessarily smaller than 1, its
marginal cost. In our model, there are five potential sources of inefficiency.
The first two come from the fact the patrons care only about their own
welfare.
(1) This and the absence of lump-sum taxes, because of the existence of
the informal sector, prevent the patrons from providing the socially
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efficient level of I e, and then taxing away all of the benefits for their
own consumption. Taking this into account, the equilibrium (revenue-
maximizing) level of the good would satisfy 1 = (1 − α)τ Ay′(I 1) with
I 1 < I e.
(2) The second source of inefficiency is that the incumbent patron
discounts the benefits from I by the probability that he will be
elected. This entails a level of investment 1 = PP(1 − α)τ Ay′(I 2) with
I 2 < I 1 < I e.
These effects are entirely standard and unsurprising. The next three
effects are less trivial.
(3) The fact that I is a public good, but that λ1 agents are, by Assumption
1, inefficiently employed in the public sector, means that the level of
investment satisfies PP(1 − α)τ Ay′(I 3)λ2 = 1 where I 3 < I 2 < I 1 <
I e. Hence, when agents are employed in the public sector to influence
their political behavior, public goods that only increase private-sector
productivity are undersupplied.
(4) Next, ∂PP/∂ I < 0, implying (∂PP/∂ I ){(1 − α)τ Ay(I )λ2 + [R(ε) −
wP1 ]λ1} < 0, which implies that the level of investment I maxc (A) must
have the property that PP(1 − α)τ Ay′[I maxc (A)]λ2 > 1. So, by the con-
cavity (diminishing marginal productivity) of y(.), I maxc (A) < I
3 <
I 2 < I 1 < I e. This effect stems from the fact that as the provision
of the public good increases, it allow the alternative patron to increase
the utility that it can offer citizens. Thus, underprovision arises be-
cause it increases the comparative political advantage of the incumbent
patron.
(5) Finally, to be in the clientelistic regime, the patron has to choose
an investment level, which ensures his credibility (i.e., I ∗c =
min{I maxc (A), Ĩ (A)} ≤ I maxc (A)). From this, it follows that I ∗c < I e.
This effect is interesting because it shows that one incentive to under-
invest stems from the need to keep offers of employment credible in
order to increase the probability of re-election. Reducing I achieves
this because by making the private sector less productive, it makes
public-sector employment relatively more attractive.
In the non-clientelistic regime, the patron’s problem becomes
max
I
V Pu (I , A) =
1
2
(1 − α)τ Ay(I ) − I (12)
s.t . I > Ĩ (A). (13)
This is because, when equation (4) binds the profit from public-sector em-
ployment, R(ε) − [ψ(ε)/qP1 ] is less than (1 − α)τ Ay(I ), which is what
the patron would get by leaving the agent in the private sector, and
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(1 − α)τ Ay′(I ) − 1 = 0, (14)
which implicitly defines a solution I maxu (A). Let Ṽ
P
u (A) be the maximized
value of equation (12) Ṽ Pu (A) = V Pu (max{I maxu (A), Ĩ (A)}, A) where the sub-
script refers to the non-clientelistic regime. We have then the following.
Proposition 2. In the non-clientelistic regime, the equilibrium level of pro-
vision I ∗u = max{I maxu (A), Ĩ (A)} is smaller than the socially efficient level
of provision of the good I e. When [ψ(ε)/qP1 ](1 − qP1 )(1 − λ1) < 1/2hs1, I ∗u
is greater than I ∗c .
The fact that I ∗u is smaller than the socially efficient level of provision of
the good I e is immediate. Comparing marginal incentives in conditions (10)
and (14), in general, we cannot sign unambiguously the difference between
optimal investment under the clientelistic regime and optimal investment
under the non-clientelistic regime. On the one hand, it is clear that in
the non-clientelistic regime, the patron has no incentive to underinvest in
order to bias the outcome of the election (i.e., no term with ∂PP/∂ I ).
Also, once elected, public investment has a higher marginal return to the
non-clientelistic patron, because both agents in group 1 and 2 can be
taxed in such a regime. On the other hand, the patron discounts more
heavily the marginal return of investment I because the probability of
keeping power, which is 1/2, is less than that of PP under clientelism. The
condition (ψ(ε)/qP1 )(1 − qP1 )(1 − λ1) < 1/2hs1 ensures that the two first
effects dominate the last effect. Indeed, it is simple to see that, under this
condition,
∂V Pu (I , A)
∂ I
>
∂V Pc (I , A)
∂ I
for all I . Hence, assuming the concavity of V Pu (I , A) and V
P
c (I , A) in I ,
12
it follows immediately that I ∗c ≤ I maxc (A) < I maxu (A) < I ∗u .
Finally, we close this section by characterizing the circumstances under
which the clientelistic regime is the equilibrium regime (we relegate the
proof to the Appendix). To keep things simple, we do this simply in terms
of the productivity parameter A. We show the following result.
12 This will hold under certain technical conditions.
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Proposition 3. If A is sufficiently small, the incumbent patron inefficiently
employs his clients to bias the outcome of the election. When A is suffi-
ciently high, however, it is optimal to abandon clientelism.
As A increases, the value of the regime where there is no clientelism,
and therefore no underinvestment to bias the election, rises relative to the
clientelistic regime. It is clear why this is so. In the clientelistic regime,
in order to bias the outcome of the election, the patron must inefficiently
employ group 1, meaning that only agents in group 2 can be taxed. At
some point, the opportunity cost of clientelism becomes so large that it is
optimal for the patron to switch away from it.
Comparative Statics
Two interesting comparative statics can be derived for the level of invest-
ment in the clientelistic regime whenever it is determined by the marginal
condition (10) (i.e., I maxc (A) < Ĩ (A)
13).










Recall that h is the density of the aggregate ideological shock θ . The
larger h is, the tighter the distribution around zero. Using the second-order














−αAy′(I )λ1s1x + ∂P
P
∂h
(1 − α)τ Ay′(I )λ2
]
,
where x = {(1 − α)τ Ay(I )λ2 + [R(ε) − wP1 ]λ1} > 0 and ∂PP/∂h > 0. In
general, there are two effects of higher h. On the one hand, higher h in-
creases the marginal effect of I on PP, which reduces investment. On the
13 This will hold when A is small enough.
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other hand, other things being equal, a higher h increases the probabil-
ity that the incumbent will win the election. This increases the expected
marginal benefit from investing and leads to higher I . However, using
the first-order condition, in the Appendix we show that the second effect
dominates.14
There are several interesting interpretations of what rents might be. Note
that although we have conducted the comparative statics by varying R(ε),
we could have simply added an extra term ρ to capture the extra benefits
from being in office. These could be natural resource rents accruing to
the government, in which case the model explains how a political econ-
omy resource curse operates, biasing down public investment and inducing
inefficient redistribution. All of these features might help to explain why
clientelistic politics seems to be endemic in developing countries. They
might also help to explain why, as productivity grows, while the private-
sector economy develops, more materialistic preferences develop, and as
inequality falls, the extent of clientelism falls, and the efficiency of gov-
ernment policies improves.
IV. Observable Voting
Now, we extend the model to allow for voting behavior to be observ-
able. Even when there is a secret ballot, this analysis might be relevant
because, while not observing individual behavior, politicians can observe
more aggregate behavior, such as the voting patterns of electoral districts.
Thus, even though individual exchanges between politicians and voters can-
not be made contingent, politicians can make contingent offers to larger
collections of voters. Moreover, secret ballots are not effectively enforced
in many developing countries today and electoral corruption has been of
14 Other comparative statics exercises with respect to productivity A, ability to tax α, and
cost of tax collection τ can also be undertaken. However, the results are ambiguous. For





















An increase in productivity, A, has four effects. The first term in the expression is negative
because (∂2 PP/∂ I∂A) < 0. Higher A increases the marginal impact of reducing I on the
probability of winning, further encouraging underinvestment. The final term is also negative.
This captures the effect that higher A increases the benefit of being in power, which tends to
reduce I . However, the second term PP(1 − α)τ y′(I )λ2 is positive and tends to increase I .
Higher A increases the marginal productivity of I , and this tends to increase the opportunity
cost of underinvestment, a force that induces higher I . Finally, because ∂PP/∂A < 0, the
third term tends to increase the underprovision of the public good I . Intuitively, higher A
reduces the relative attractiveness of the incumbent patron to agents of group 1. In response
to this, the incumbent patron compensates by reducing I . The whole impact of an increase
in productivity A on I is therefore a priori ambiguous.
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great importance historically in most countries.15 Although as shown in
Section III. clientelism does not require observable political behavior, nev-
ertheless, it has also thrived in such circumstances. Therefore, we extend
the model to this case. If voting is observable, then patrons can make offers
of employment conditional on voting behavior. In essence, they can offer
an exchange, a job if a client votes for them, but not otherwise. We now
show that this leads to inefficient underinvestment of a qualitatively similar
sort as in Section III. Now, the incumbent patron wishes to underinvest,
not to reduce what the potential patron can credibly offer to his clients, but
rather to reduce what his clients can receive when they are punished and
not employed.
To model this situation, we need some more notation. Let P1 be the
probability expected by individual i that the incumbent patron wins the
election when he supports the patron, and let P2 be the analogous proba-
bility when i does not support the patron. In this case, given the policies
offered by the incumbent patron and the potential patron, a voter i in group





] + (1 − P1)αAy(I ) + δi + θ ≥ P2αAy(I ) + (1 − P2)αAy(I ).
(15)
This incentive constraint takes into account the fact that if the client devi-
ates and the patron is elected, the client will be punished by being denied a
public-sector job. Note, first, that because there are a continuum of voters,
P1 = P2 = Pe. Thus, this becomes
Pe
[
wP1 − ψ(ε) − αAy(I )
] + δi + θ ≥ 0. (16)
Note how similar equation (16) is to equation (5). When voting behavior is
observable, the client has to take into account the possibility of punishment.
This removes the effects of the potential patron’s offer, but it introduces
the pay-off from being punished, which has very similar qualitative effects
on the efficiency of investment.
From the above calculations, this case is easy to analyze. Again, we find










≡ PP (I , Pe) .
15 For example, the Australian secret ballot was only introduced in Colombia in 1988. Before
this, the political parties printed their own ballot papers, making it relatively easy to monitor
who voted for whom (see Hartlyn and Valenzuela, 1998). Non-secret balloting is also still
frequently used, for example, in Kenya (Throup and Hornsby, 1998) and other places in
Africa (Bratton and van der Walle, 1997).
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Simplifying, this probability is



















g λgsg = 1 again. The only difference here is the presence of Pe.
The probability that the patron wins the election now depends on the ex-
pected probability that he wins because of the way this enters the incentive
constraint.
To focus on the main point of interest, we consider only the case in
which it is ex post credible for the patron to offer public-sector jobs and
a clientelistic regime prevails.16 Hence, we can again calculate the optimal
level of investment for the incumbent patron from the maximization of










} + PP(1 − α)τ Ay′(I )λ2 − 1 = 0.
However, we now have
∂PP
∂ I
= −hλ1s1αAy′(I )Pe < 0. (17)
To determine the equilibrium I and its comparative statics, we impose
rational expectations so that





wP1 − ψ(ε) − αAy(I )
]} .
Thus, the first-order condition, substituting for ∂PP/∂ I , becomes
−hλ1s1αAy′(I )
{













Clearly, condition (18) looks very similar to condition (10). Moreover,
inefficient underprovision of I again arises. However, the incumbent patron
now undersupplies I , not to reduce what the potential patron can credibly
offer to group 1, but rather to punish members of group 1 harder if they
decide to vote against the incumbent patron.
16 Again, this is the case when A is small enough.
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V. Extension to Three Groups
Here, we extend the basic model of Section II. to allow for three groups.
In addition to the two groups there, we allow for a third group, which is
composed of the clients of the potential patron. Let the population masses
of the three groups be λg for g = 1, 2, 3. We assume that for group 3,
qN3 > R(ε)/ψ(ε) > q
P
3 , so that the potential patron, but not the incumbent
patron, can make credible employment offers to members of this group.
Let wN = ψ(ε)/qN3 be the efficiency wage paid by the incumbent patron
in power to members of group 3, and let us drop the subscript on wP1 .
We assume that it is always profitable for the potential patron to offer
employment to all members of group 3. Therefore, in group 3, where only
the potential patron can credibly make job offers, voter i supports the
patron if
αAy(I ) + δi + θ ≥ wN − ψ(ε). (19)
Equation (19) shows that the patron is at a disadvantage in group 3 because
he cannot promise to employ members in this group, while the potential
patron can. In addition to the previous equations for N1 and N2, we have





+ s3[αAy(I ) − (wN − ψ(ε)) + θ]
}
.
This is because, in this case, we must have δi ≥ wN − ψ(ε) − αAy(I ) − θ .
Now, we have







P + λ3s3U N
)
,
with U P = wP − ψ(ε) − αAy(I ) > 0 and U N = αAy(I ) − [wN −
ψ(ε)] < 0. Hence,
PP(I ) = 1
2
+ h{ [αAy(I ) + ψ(ε)] (λ3s3 − λ1s1) + λ1s1wP − λ3s3wN}. (20)
Now, the probability that the patron wins the election is no longer nec-
essarily greater than one-half. Although employing members of group 1
increases PP (I ), the fact that the potential patron can make credible
job offers to group 3 tends to reduce it. What is critical for the effi-
ciency results is the sign of [∂PP (I )]/∂ I . This is determined by the term
λ3s3 − λ1s1. This term generates underinvestment if λ1s1 > λ3s3 so that
[∂PP (I )]/∂ I < 0. In this case, as before, the desire to reduce what the po-
tential patron can offer to group 1 dominates. However, in this model, there
is a countervailing incentive. This stems from the fact that by increasing I
the incumbent patron increases what he can credibly offer to members of
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group 3, thus narrowing the potential patron’s advantage with this group.
Indeed, if λ3s3 − λ1s1 > 0, this second effect dominates, [∂PP (I )]/∂ I > 0,
and this term tends to increase investment. Underinvestment arises when
the clients of the patron are larger in number than the clients of the po-
tential patron, or when the clients of the incumbent patron are relatively
homogeneous ideologically, and thus they can be easily swayed by offers
of income (high s1).
The model with three groups can easily be extended to the case where
voting is observable. In this case, a member of group 3 supports the
patron if
δi + θ ≥ (1 − P)[wN − ψ(ε) − αAy(I )]. (21)
Compare this to equation (19). When λ3s3(1 − P) − λ1s1 P < 0, this term
again generates underinvestment.
VI. Inequality
Now, we extend the model of Section I. to investigate the implications of
inequality for clientelism. We assume that there are three groups, 1, 2, and
3, where the incumbent patron can make credible job offers to groups 1
and 2 but not to group 3. As in Section II. we assume for simplicity that
the potential patron can make no credible offers. Let the first two groups
both be of size λ/2, with group 3 being of size 1 − λ. Both groups 1
and 2 have the same q and will thus be paid the same efficiency wage.
Also, to emphasize clearly the role of economic inequality, we assume that
the two groups are identically distributed with respect to their ideological
preferences so that s1 = s2 = s.
An individual of group 1 has an income σ 1 Ay(I ), while a member of
group 2 has income σ 2 Ay(I ). In order to be consistent with total income,
which is equal to λAy(I ), given that the two groups are of equal size λ/2,
we should have σ 1λ/2 + σ 2λ/2 = λ or σ 1 + σ 2 = 2. Thus, it is convenient
to reparametrize σ 1 and σ 2 as
σ 1 = 1 + x ; σ 2 = 1 − x with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, (22)
where x measures the degree of income inequality between the two groups
of voters (group 1 is richer than group 2). Inequality (5) becomes
wP − ψ(ε) + δi + θ ≥ σ gαAy(I ) for g = 1, 2.
We also require that public-sector employment for each group must be ex
post credible. That is, equation (4) becomes
(1 − α)σ gτ Ay(I ) ≤ R(ε) − wP for g = 1, 2. (23)
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No clientelism
clientelism with 1 group






Fig. 2. The impact of inequality on clientelism
Let I1(x) and I2(x) denote the levels of investment over which the incum-
bent patron cannot make credible offers to the agents of groups 1 and 2,
respectively. Using equation (23), these are given by








1 − x . (24)
Note that I1(0) = I2(0) = Ĩ (A) and I1(x) < I2(x) for x ∈ (0, 1] because
the opportunity cost of offering public-sector jobs to the richer and more
productive agents of group 1 is higher than offering them to the poorer
and less productive agents of group 2. From this, it follows that there
are three regimes. For I ≤ I1(x), the patron can make credible offers to
both groups 1 and 2 – a regime we refer to as complete clientelism.
For I1(x) < I ≤ I2(x), the patron can only make offers to the agents of
the poorer group 2 – a regime we describe as incomplete clientelism.
Finally, for I2(x) < I , there is no clientelism (i.e., the non-clientelistic
regime). The three regimes are easily represented in Figure 2 in terms of
the level of inequality x and the level of provision of I . It is apparent that
as inequality increases from x = 0 (i.e., perfect equality) to x = 1 (i.e.,
complete inequality), the incomplete clientelism region grows larger as it
becomes cheaper to provide public jobs to the poor and more expensive to
do the same for the rich. Overall, clientelism (complete and incomplete)
increases at the expense of the non-clientelistic regime.
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Now, it is easy to calculate the incumbent patron’s probability of winning
the election in the clientelistic regimes. This is given by
PP(I ) = 1
2





s[wP − ψ(ε) − α(1 − x)Ay(I )] when I1(x) < I ≤ I2(x).
We can also write the problem of the incumbent patron in the three regimes.
Compared to Section II. only the intermediate case of incomplete clien-
telism has different first-order conditions. In such a regime, the problem
can be stated as
max
I
V Pic(I ) = PP (I )
{













s.t . I1(x) < I ≤ I2(x). (26)












+ [R(ε) − wP]λ
2
}















sα(1 − x)Ay′(I ). (28)
Here, I maxic (x) denotes the solution of equation (27) in the incomplete
clientelistic regime. It follows immediately that, as in the other regimes
(complete clientelism and non-clientelistic), the optimal level of provision
of I ∗ic(x) = min[max{I maxic (x), I1(x), I2(x)}] in the incomplete clientelistic
regime is less than the socially optimal one I e. We can also see imme-
diately that as x increases, the left-hand side of equation (27) increases
for two reasons. First, the patron’s clients become less productive. This
implies that provision of I has less of a detrimental effect on the probabil-
ity that the patron will remain in power (i.e., (∂2 PP)/(∂ I∂x) > 0). Hence,
the patron is more likely to invest in I . Second, the rich agents also be-
come more productive. This increases the tax base of the private sector,
which increases the marginal return of I from the point of view of the
patron. It follows that I maxic (x) is increasing with x . This does not neces-
sarily imply that the optimal provision of the incumbent patron I ∗ic(x) is
increasing with x because, from equation (24), I1(x) is decreasing with x .
Indeed, consider the case where the productivity level A is small enough
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that I maxic (0) < I1(0) = Ĩ (A). Then, clearly for some range of x in an inter-
val [0, x], I maxic (x) < I1(x) and I
∗
ic(x) = min[max{I maxic (x), I1(x), I2(x)}] =
I1(x) is decreasing with the level of inequality x .
We can summarize this discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. a) An increase in inequality x within the group of the
patron’s clients increases the likelihood of clientelism, and makes it more
likely that clientelism will occur with the poorest agents.
b) For a low enough productivity level A, the optimal level of provision
of I in that clientelistic regime is decreasing with the level of inequality
x ,at least when x is not too big.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that an attempt to understand what types of
policies politicians can actually commit to can provide a new explanation
for why income redistribution often takes an inefficient form – in particular,
through offers of employment in the bureaucracy. An innovation of our
approach is to conceptualize redistributive politics as an exchange between
politicians and voters and to emphasize that the issue of credibility is two-
sided. We have studied the circumstances under which such exchanges can
be mutually incentive-compatible. From this perspective, redistribution takes
the form of public-sector employment because a job is a credible, selective,
and reversible method of redistribution, which ties the continuation utility of
a voter to the political success of a particular politician. We have shown that
other types of policies are inefficiently undersupplied in equilibrium, either
because they are not credible (income transfers), or because they influence
the terms of trade between politicians and their supporters (public goods
or public investment). Inefficiencies in other public policies arise because
of the way they interact with such clientelistic redistribution. In particular,
they arise in our model because of a desire to make political exchanges
incentive-compatible.
Such relationships are called patronage or clientelism in the body of
literature concerning political science, and our model provides a formaliza-
tion of some key ideas in this informal body of literature. Consistent with
some of the claims in this body of literature, our model also has several
implications that can help us to understand why clientelistic politics and
the consequent inefficient redistribution might be endemic to developing
countries. We have shown that characteristics such as low productivity and
inequality make clientelism relatively attractive to politicians.
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Appendix
Ex Post Unemployment in the Public Sector
In the main body of the paper, we have assumed that the patron had access
to an alternative technology, which generates rents  ≡ R(ε) − ψ(ε)/qP1 .
The role of this alternative technology, which gives exactly the same amount
of rents to the patron as a voter employed at the efficiency wage, was to
ensure a credible threat for the patron ex post not to employ a deviat-
ing voter. We now sketch a more realistic alternative model where some
potential employees are left unemployed, in order to make the threat of non-
employment credible. We assume that the technology of production of the
public sector is characterized by a decreasing returns-to-scale production
function Q = R(eng), where e ∈ {0, ε} is the effort level of an employed
civil servant, ng is the number of employed individuals in the public sector,
and R(.) is an increasing concave function with R′ > 0, R′′ < 0 and the
conditions R(0) = 0, εR′(ελ1) = 0 and Ay(0) > R′(0) − ψ(ε) (inefficiency
of the public sector).
Clearly, applying a similar reasoning to that employed in the main body






, ψ(ε) + αAy(I )
}
. (A1)
It should then be optimal for the incumbent patron to employ his
marginal client ex post
εR′(εng) − wPg = (1 − α)τ Ay(I ). (A2)
The marginal net benefit εR′(εng) − wPg that the incumbent patron derives
from providing a public-sector job to one of his clients should be higher
than (1 − α)τ Ay(I ) (i.e., the tax revenue that he can extract from having
that client work in the private sector). Equation (A2) determines an equi-
librium ex post public employment level ng(I ,wPg ). This level is obviously
decreasing with the public wage offer wPg . It is also decreasing with the
investment level I . A larger value of I increases both the productivity of
the private sector and the tax revenues that could be collected from having
the marginal client work in the private sector. Considering equation (A1),




= ψ(ε) + αAy(I ∗0 ),
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the shape of ng(I ) is then given by






when I ≤ I ∗0
ng(I ) = n1g(I ) when I > I ∗0 .




) = ψ(ε) + [α + (1 − α)τ ]Ay(I ).
The first regime I ≤ I ∗0 corresponds to the clientelistic regime, with rents
allocated to the clients employed in the public sector. The regime I > I ∗0
corresponds to the non-clientelistic case, where such rents do not exist.
Consider the voting behavior of the clients. In the group where only the





] + [1 − ng(I )
λ1
]
αAy(I ) + δi + θ ≥ αAy(I ).
Compared to equation (5), this equation differs because it takes into account
the fact that, ex post, not all clients will be given a public-sector job. With
the probability ng/λ1, a client will receive such a position and obtain





client will not be given a public-sector job and will therefore receive a net
income αAy(I ) in the private sector of the economy. A member of group
1 supports the incumbent patron if
δi ≥ ng(I )
λ1
{
αAy(I ) − [wP1 − ψ(ε)]} − θ.
The probability that the patron stays in power will become




wP1 − ψ(ε) − αAy(I )
]
, (A3)
which is clearly a decreasing function of I because
∂ P̃P
∂ I
= −hng(I )s1αAy′(I ) + hs1n′g(I )
[
wP1 − ψ(ε) − αAy(I )
]
< 0. (A4)
In the clientelistic regime (i.e., when I ≤ I ∗0 ), ex ante the patron will now
maximize
Ṽ Pc (I , A) = P̃P (I ) [(1 − α)τ Ay(I )(λ2 + λ1)
+ {R[εng(I )] − [wP1 + (1 − α)τ Ay(I )] ng(I )}] − I ,
while he will obviously use the same function V Pu (I , A) = (1/2)(1 −
α)τ Ay(I ) − I in the non-clientelistic regime. An analysis of the main body
of the paper can be performed with the new value functions Ṽ Pc (I , A) and
C© The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2013.
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V Pu (I , A), which yields similar qualitative results, although the details are
more complex.
Equilibrium Regimes
Proof of Proposition 3: We prove some of the results used in the paper.
Recall that the value of the clientelistic regime is Ṽ Pc (A) =
V Pc [min{I maxc (A), Ĩ (A)}, A], while that of the non-clientelistic regime is
Ṽ Pu (A) = V Pu [max{I maxu (A), Ĩ (A)}, A].
(i) First, we show that
∂V Pu
(










so that as A increases, the value of the regime where there is no
underinvestment to bias the election rises relative to the clientelistic
regime. Using the envelope theorem, this inequality can be written as
1
2
(1 − α)τ y(I maxu ) > PP (I maxc ) (1 − α)τ y(I maxc )λ2 + ∂PP(I maxc )∂A D,
where D = {(1 − α)τ Ay(I maxc )(1 − λ1) + λ1[R(ε) − wP]}. Otherwise,
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which follows from the standard assumptions we have made on y(.)
and from the fact that I maxu > I
max
c .
(ii) There exists A such that, when A ∈ [0, A), V Pc (I maxc , A) >
V Pu (I
max
u , A) while for A ∈ [A,∞), V Pu (I maxu , A) ≥ V Pc (I maxc , A). In-
deed, V Pu [I
max
u (0), 0] = 0, while V Pc [I maxc (0), 0] > 0 because a clien-
telistic patron makes rents from employing members of group
1. Note that as A becomes very large, limA→∞ V Pu (I
max
u , A) >
limA→∞ V Pc (I
max
c , A). This follows from the L’Hopital rule, which
immediately shows that the value for the non-clientelistic regime
V Pu (I
max





(iii) Finally, note that the threshold level of investment Ĩ (A) is decreasing
with A with limA→0 Ĩ (A) = +∞. Also, we have A0 such that y(0) =
[R(ε) − wP]/[A0(1 − α)τ ], which means that Ĩ (A) = 0 for all A ≥ A0.
It follows from (i), (ii), and (iii) that for A small enough,
min{I maxc (A), Ĩ (A)} = I maxc (A) and max{I maxu (A), Ĩ (A)} = Ĩ (A). Hence,
for A small enough, Ṽ Pc (A) = V Pc [I maxc (A), A] > V Pu (I maxu , A) >
V Pu [̃I (A), A] = Ṽ Pu (A), and the clientelistic regime dominates the
non-clientelistic regime.
Also, for A large enough (i.e., larger than max{A0, A}), Ĩ (A) = 0
and Ṽ Pc (A) = V Pc (0, A) < V Pu (I maxu , A) = Ṽ Pu (A), and the non-clientelistic
regime dominates the clientelistic regime. 
Comparative Statics






−s1αAy′(I )xλ1 + ∂P
P
∂h
(1 − α)τ Ay′(I )λ2
]
, (A5)
where x = {(1 − α)τ Ay(I )λ2 + [R(ε) − wP1 ]λ1} > 0. Now, the first-order
condition can be written as
−s1αAy′(I )λ1 = 1 − P
P(1 − α)τ Ay′(I )λ2
h
.
By using this to substitute −s1αAy′(I )λ1 from equation (A5) and by sim-
plifying, we show that dI∗/dh > 0 if and only if 1/2h > 0, which is
true.
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